NOTES ON ARISTOPHANES' *ACHARNIANS*

(1) *πρόβαινέ νυν, ὦ θυμέ· γραμμὴ δ' αὐτηί.* 483

Dikaiopolis, having borrowed a beggar's disguise from Euripides, is about to return to the place where he has set the butcher's block over which he will make his defence of his private peace-treaty. He finds, however, that his *θυμός* (or *καρδία*) is reluctant to take the plunge. 'Forward now, my soul,' he says to it, 'here's [or 'there's'] the *γραμμή*'. What does *γραμμή* mean here? Plainly we are meant to think of a foot-race; but is the 'line' in question the starting line or the finishing line? The question has implications for production. If it is the starting line, Dikaiopolis must point to an imaginary line on the ground just in front of him; if the finishing line, he must point to the block. The scholia take *γραμμή* to mean 'starting line' here; but this sense has no fifth-century support. At this date *γραμμή* in connection with races meant always 'finishing line'[1] (Pind. *Pyth.* 9. 118; Eur. *El.* 956; Eur. fr. 169); and even though the same line served also to mark the start in some races (such as the diaulos), nevertheless the starting-point was not called *γραμμή* but *βαλβῖδες* (*Knights* 1159, *Wasps* 548). The sense of the passage also calls for *γραμμή* in *Ach.* 483 to be taken as meaning 'goal': what Dikaiopolis' *θυμός* needs to be told is not where it has to start from (for it is already there) but where it has to get to.

(2) Δι. *ὁ ποῖος οὗτος Λάμαχος τὴν ἔγχελυν;*
Θε. *ὁ δεινός, ὁ ταλαύρινος, ὃς τὴν Γοργόνα*
πάλλει, κραδαίνων τρεῖς κατασκίους λόφους. 965

The existence, in the fourth century, of a Tydeus son of Lamachos of Oe (*IG* ii^2. 1556. 30) long ago gave rise to the plausible conjecture that this Tydeus was the grandson of the Tydeus who was a commander in the latter part of the Peloponnesian War ([Lys.] 20. 26; Xen. *Hell.* 2. 1. 16), and great-grandson of the famous Lamachos, whose deme, though not directly known, was in the tribe Oineis[2] as Oe was. The name Tydeus was decidedly unusual in classical times,[3] so that a relationship is prima facie likely; and *Ach.* 965 provides, I think, a hitherto neglected bit of further evidence in its favour. The line is an adaptation of Aesch. *Seven* 384; and in Aeschylus it refers to – Tydeus! I suggest that there is here a dig at Lamachos for having given his son this archaic warrior-hero's name. There may also be an insinuation that Lamachos has other qualities of the original Tydeus, who was *μαργῶν καὶ μάχης λελιμμένος* (*Seven* 380).

(3) After his glowing description (1089–93) of the delights of the feast to which Dikaiopolis is invited, the messenger tells him to 'hurry as fast as possible'

[1] One may compare the modern use of the expression 'the line' in races of various kinds or in rugby football.

[2] The Acharnians style him their fellow-tribesman (*Ach.* 568).

[3] I know of no Athenian who bore the name other than the two already mentioned (for *P.A.* 13883a might be identical with the fourth-century Tydeus son of Lamachos). There was, however, one other contemporary Tydeus of some significance – the pro-Athenian son of Ion of Chios (Thuc. 8.38.3).

to get there. Then (1094–5), according to the manuscripts, Lamachos groans *κακοδαίμων ἐγώ* and Dikaiopolis retorts *καὶ γάρ σὺ μεγάλην ἐπεγράφου τὴν Γοργόνα.*

I said 'retorts'; but in fact no one has ever explained in what way 1095 is a natural reaction to what has preceded. The only plausible solution is that proposed by the late D. S. Robertson, whose unpublished lecture notes I have been enabled to utilize by the kindness of Dr. N. G. Wilson. He saw that the emphatic placement of *μεγάλην* in 1095 implies that some part or derivative of *μέγας* has just been used by Lamachos; in other words, that there is a lacuna before 1095.

The particle-combination *καὶ γάρ*, it may be added, points the same way. Elsewhere in Aristophanes *καὶ γάρ* in replies normally means 'yes, and',[4] which would not in any case be appropriate here; but there is another use of *καὶ γάρ*, common in Euripides, which is directly in point. One speaker complains of some injury done to him, and is reminded by another that he has himself been guilty of similar conduct; and almost always a word from the complaint is echoed in the retort. Thus:

Herakles 754–5

Λυ. *ὦ πᾶσα Κάδμου γαῖ', ἀπόλλυμαι δόλῳ.*
Χο. *καὶ γὰρ διώλλυς . . .*

Phoin. 607

Πο. *ἐξελαυνόμεσθα πατρίδος.*
Ετ. *καὶ γὰρ ἦλθες ἐξελῶν.*

Phoin. 620

Πο. *ὅδε γὰρ εἰς ἡμᾶς ὑβρίζει.*
Ετ. *καὶ γὰρ ἀνθυβρίζομαι.*

Ba. 1346–7

Κα. *ἐγνώκαμεν ταῦτ' · ἀλλ' ἐπεξέρχῃ λίαν.*
Δι. *καὶ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμῶν θεὸς γεγὼς ὑβριζόμην.*

Ba. 1374–7[5]

Αγ. *δεινῶς γὰρ τάνδ' αἰκείαν*
Διόνυσος ἄναξ τοὺς σοὺς εἰς
οἴκους ἔφερεν.
Δι. *καὶ γὰρ ἔπασχον δεινὰ πρὸς ὑμῶν . . .*

Note the pronouns in *Ba.* 1347 and 1377, which correspond to *σὺ* in *Ach.* 1095. Earlier than any of these Euripidean examples is an Aristophanic one which differs in that (i) *καὶ* and *γὰρ* are separated, (ii) owing to its elliptical expression the retort contains no verbal echo of the complaint:

[4] *Knights* 1088, 1092; *Lys.* 1181; *Ekkl.* 998. In *Lys.* 12 the meaning could be either 'yes, <we are thought to be wicked> and what's more, by jove, we *are* wicked' or 'yes, <we are thought to be wicked> because, by jove, we *are* wicked'; I prefer the former slightly, not only for consistency with the other passages but also because it seems a little livelier.

[5] There may well be considerable corruption in the text of this passage; but the only textual point important for our purposes is that many critics have followed Hermann in giving 1377 f. to Kadmos and altering *ἔπασχον* to *ἔπασχεν*. This, if correct, would not affect the central features of the idiom under discussion; as *Herakles* 755 shows, the riposte introduced by *καὶ γάρ* is not always made by the same person who takes the retaliatory action complained of.

Knights 1200–1

Πα. οἴμοι τάλας, ἀδίκως γε τἄμ' ὑφήρπασας.
Αλ. νὴ τὸν Ποσειδῶ, καὶ σὺ γὰρ τοὺς ἐκ Πύλου.

This use of καὶ γάρ may be glossed 'yes, for (I/you) likewise . . .'. It is not found in Aeschylus or Sophocles, and may have been adopted by Euripides from everyday speech.

If *Ach.* 1095 is an example of this usage, the positing of a lacuna is almost inevitable. Nothing in the parallel passages suggests that 1095 would be a possible response to a bare κακοδαίμων ἐγώ; rather they confirm Robertson's insight – note especially how in *Knights* 1200 the ejaculation οἴμοι τάλας is followed by a specific complaint of unfair treatment, just as κακοδαίμων ἐγώ will have been if Robertson is right.

All the examples cited above admittedly differ from *Ach.* 1095 in one important respect. In each of them the second speaker appeals to the *lex talionis* in its simplest form; the treatment inflicted on the first speaker is justified by the fact that he has himself inflicted similar treatment on others. On no conceivable hypothesis as to what may have stood in any lacuna before *Ach.* 1095 can 1095 have constituted any such simple and direct example of δράσαντα παθεῖν: Lamachos cannot have been complaining that anybody, in any sense, μέγαν αὐτὸν ἐπεγράψατο. We may, however, have here a comic variant of the standard pattern. On the surface, if Lamachos' complaint, contained in the lost line, was something of the order of <ὡς μεγάλα περιβάλλει με δυστυχήματα>, the *talio* is purely verbal and trivial: because Lamachos painted a *big* Gorgon on his shield, he has been punished with *great* misfortunes: a parody, in fact, of the Euripidean mannerism, which is not likely to have been used for the first time in *Herakles*. But in a deeper sense Lamachos is getting precisely his just deserts. Since his first appearance, the fearsome Gorgon has been the symbol of his bellicosity (567, 574, 582, 964) and of his determination that others shall endure the miseries of war so that he can serve in safety on well-paid embassies (cf. 595–619). Now that the boot is on the other leg and it is Lamachos himself that has to go on arduous and dangerous active service, he is complaining; but, says Dikaiopolis in effect, his sufferings are justified by the fact that by refusing to countenance peace (by preferring, in fact, to adopt the Gorgon as his emblem) he has compelled others to undergo similar hardships. It is this underlying thought that can really account for the use of καὶ γάρ in 1095, if Robertson was right in positing a lacuna before the line; and the parallels cited, as well as the lack of any other credible explanation of 1095, strongly suggest that Robertson was indeed right.

(4) Dikaiopolis forthwith continues:

σύγκλῃε· καὶ δεῖπνόν τις ἐνσκευαζέτω.

An order to close a door is surprising at this point: far from being ready to go to the feast, Dikaiopolis has not even begun to prepare (apart from cooking the food), so that the natural moment for closing the door, the moment of departure, is still well in the future; and more importantly, the very next words Dikaiopolis speaks are to order a slave to bring him *out* (ἔξω δεῦρο) a box, for which purpose the door must of course be opened again (and so repeatedly at least as far as 1133). It therefore clearly cannot be the case that in 1096 Dikaiopolis is simply ordering that his house door, having previously been open, is now to be closed. Three alternative solutions are prima facie available .

(*a*) That the understood object of σύγκλῃε is something other than 'the door' or 'the house'. No credible suggestion, however, has been made along these lines; that of van Leeuwen ('pack up the dinner') makes the rest of 1096 tautological.

(*b*) That the text is corrupt. Of proposed emendations the best is Rennie's ξύγκλαε 'go to the devil and take her [sc. the Gorgon] with you'; but, as he recognized,[6] such a proposal, or any other which regards the first word of 1096 as addressed to Lamachos, requires us also to remove or emend καὶ, which in itself is blameless.

(*c*) That σύγκλῃε, like κλῆε πηκτὰ δωμάτων (479), is in effect an instruction for the *ekkyklema* to be withdrawn. If the *ekkyklema* has been in use heretofore (an assumption we shall examine in a moment), its withdrawal at this point is necessary to facilitate the constant comings and goings through the door. There is, of course, nothing odd in Dikaiopolis' momentarily speaking as an actor giving orders to the stage-hand in charge of the *ekkyklema*: cf. 416, *Clouds* 326, *Peace* 174, 729–32, 1022, etc.

References to the withdrawal of the *ekkyklema* are much less common than references to its extrusion. The latter frequently include an order to open a door, or a statement that it is opening: so Soph. *Aj.* 344, *El.* 1458; Eur. *Hipp.* 808 f., *Herakles* 1029;[7] Ar. *Knights* 1326,[8] *Clouds* 181 ff.[9] It would therefore not be surprising to find an instruction to withdraw the *ekkyklema* couched in the form 'close the door'; and this is what we do find on the only occasion in tragedy[10] when explicit reference is made to the withdrawal of this device. In Sophocles' *Ajax*, the hero is brought into sight on the *ekkyklema*[11] at line 346. He converses with Tekmessa and the chorus; he holds and speaks to his son. Then he returns the child to Tekmessa and bids her δῶμα πάκτου (579); when she hesitates, he insists πύκαζε θᾶσσον (581); but instead of obeying she pleads with him, and eventually (593) he turns away and, nominally addressing some attendants inside the hut, says οὐ ξυνέρξεθ' ὡς τάχος; whereupon, we may presume, the platform is withdrawn with Ajax on it, and the door closed. The verb used here – πακτοῦν, πυκάζειν, and ξυνέργειν – are all poetic synonyms for συγκλῄειν, an everyday verb whose most common usages seem to have been avoided in tragedy[12] but which was ready to hand when the tragic formula used in *Ajax* and no doubt elsewhere had to be adapted for comic purposes.

[6] Rennie actually wished to read ξύγκλαέ νυν.

[7] Cf. also *Med.* 1314 f., where, as was pointed out by P. D. Arnott, *Greek Scenic Conventions in the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford, 1962), p.86, the audience is *misled* into supposing that the *ekkyklema* is about to appear.

[8] I consider it virtually certain that the *ekkyklema* was used in this scene, which I intend to discuss fully in a later paper.

[9] On this scene, where the use of the *ekkyklema* has sometimes been doubted, see C. W. Dearden, *The Stage of Aristophanes* (London, 1976), pp. 65–7.

[10] Apart from *Ach.* 479 and 1096, there are two other such references in Aristophanes, both of which use expressions meaning 'roll me inside': *Knights* 1249 (κυλίνδετ' εἴσω τόνδε) and *Thesm.* 265 (εἰσκυκλησάτω).

[11] This is proved by 354, where the chorus-leader says to Tekmessa οἴμ', ὡς ἔοικας ὀρθὰ μαρτυρεῖν ἄγαν, referring to 323–7 where Ajax is described as *sitting* in the midst of the animals he has slaughtered; evidently we are presented with a motionless tableau. Despite Pickard-Cambridge (*The Theatre of Dionysus in Athens* (Oxford, 1946), pp. 109 f.), the macabre display of the animals cannot be censured as improper, or regarded as impossible, for the author of *King Oedipus* and of *Philoktetes*.

[12] Aeschylus and Sophocles, so far as we know, never use the word; Euripides uses it three times in the sense 'close' (but only of closing the mouth or the eyes) and three times in other senses.

What though is the evidence, apart from line 1096, that the *ekkyklema* was used in this part of *Acharnians*? The situation in 1003–96 is that Dikaiopolis, with the aid of his household, is preparing a meal for the evening of the Choes. One would naturally expect this to be done indoors;[13] but Dikaiopolis must be physically outside at least some of the time in order to converse with the farmer Derketes, the groomsman, the brideswoman, the messenger, and Lamachos; and the absence of any indication in the text that he ever goes in or comes out (contrast 815, 970) strongly suggests that he is physically outside the whole time. Where an actor has to be physically outdoors but theoretically indoors, the use of the *ekkyklema* is appropriate.[14]

C. W. Dearden, who has argued[15] – in many cases with considerable cogency – that we should assume for Aristophanic comedy a much freer use of the *ekkyklema* than has often been supposed, surprisingly does not posit its use in *Ach.* 1003–96. He makes two separate proposals about the staging of the scene. In the context of a discussion of the number of doors in the *skene* front[16] he suggests that 'Dicaeopolis, on stage from 1007, simply delivers his orders to a closed door, the activity of the slaves behind [it] being imagined'; this overlooks the fact that some of the activity is Dikaiopolis' own (1007 *ἀναπείρω τὰς κίχλας*, 1017 *αὐτῷ διακονεῖται*) and that an order to poke the fire (1014) can only be given by someone in a position to see whether the fire needs poking. More plausible is what is proposed in Dearden's final reconstruction of the staging of *Acharnians*:[17] 'Dicaeopolis enters [the acting area] through the door and urges his slaves to bring out spits and start cooking a meal over the fire'; they do so, and the cooking takes place 'at one side of the stage'. Nevertheless, as compared with the use of the *ekkyklema*, this proposal has clear disadvantages. It does not account for 1096. It does not explain why Dikaiopolis should do his cooking in the street. And it requires the removal of the brazier when it is no longer needed, something of which there is no trace in the text; whereas if the cooking is done on the *ekkyklema* the brazier will disappear automatically when the platform is withdrawn.

Further evidence is provided by a linguistic point. Normally, when an Aristophanic character who is unequivocally out of doors wants something brought from, or taken into, the *skene*, the words he uses are *ἐκφέρω* and *εἰσφέρω* (so 359, 887, 893; *Knights* 95, 997, etc.) In *Ach.* 1003–96 neither verb is used; instead, in analogous contexts, we find *φέρω* (1007, 1061, 1067) and *ἀποφέρω* (1067), as if it were for some reason improper to regard the relationship between the house and the place where Dikaiopolis is standing as simply that of 'inside' and 'outside'.[18] As soon as Dikaiopolis has said *σύγκλῃε*, the familiar *ἐκφέρω* and *εἰσφέρω* reappear (1097, 1098, 1099, 1118, 1123, 1133).

Probably the main reason why Dearden, like Dale,[19] is reluctant to envisage the use of the *ekkyklema* in the present scene is that it would absolutely necessi-

[13] Apart from other considerations, the Choes was a winter festival.

[14] Cf. Dearden, *The Stage of Aristophanes*, pp. 58–9, 65–6.

[15] *Stage*, pp. 50–74.

[16] *Stage*, p.26.

[17] *Stage*, p.147.

[18] Only once in Aristophanes (*Peace* 287) does *ἀποφέρω* seem to mean 'take into the *skene*'; and even there, in view of the contrast with *ἐγὼ δὲ . . . εἰσιὼν* (288), it is arguable that Kydoimos takes the *σκεύη* (a mortar and, probably, a cook's portable table) out by the wings and not into the *skene*.

[19] A. M. Dale, *Collected Papers* (Cambridge, 1969), p.291.

tate the existence of a second door in the *skene* front. If the *ekkyklema* is in use at the central door, Lamachos cannot use that door at 1072, and must therefore have a separate door of his own. There are, however, other scenes in Aristophanes where a second door is indispensable in any case,[20] and no objection can therefore be brought on this ground to the use of the *ekkyklema* in *Ach.* 1003–96.

For the sake of completeness the possibility may be mentioned[21] that Dikaiopolis does the cooking indoors and unseen, coming out only to meet the visitors at 1018 and 1048 (after 1048 nothing more is said about cooking); it tells in favour of this view that the chorus, in reference to the culinary preparations, sing only of what they can smell (1045) and hear (1015, 1042, 1046) without any indication that they can *see* anything of what is going on. This proposal meets some, but not all, of the objections raised against other proposals. It still does not account for the apparent taboo on ἐκφέρω and εἰσφέρω, which applies after 1048 as well as before. And it may be noted that 1011 f., 'What <will you say> when you see the thrushes being roasted?', indicates that the thrushes will be cooked in view of the chorus, and strongly suggests that the whole of Dikaiopolis' share of the cooking is done in their sight.[22]

Why then, do the chorus refer only to what can be heard and smelt? The answer is that they are thinking not primarily of what they can perceive themselves, but of what others can perceive. The ἥκουσας of 1015 and 1042 corresponds to similar expressions in 836 and 971, and all are probably addressed (as 971 explicitly is) to the audience, who can hear what Dikaiopolis is saying much better than they can see exactly what he is cooking. In 1045–6 those who are going to 'die of hunger' because of Dikaiopolis' shouts and the savoury aroma are the chorus *and the neighbours*; the latter at any rate, in their houses, will have only the smell and the sounds to go by.

I conclude that the *ekkyklema* comes out at 1003, with Dikaiopolis, a couple of slaves (addressed in the plural at 1042 and 1047), food, cooking utensils, and a brazier.[23] In 1003–6 Dikaiopolis calls back into the house, giving orders to

[20] See K. J. Dover, *PCPhS* 12 (1966), 2 ff. Dearden, *Stage*, pp. 20–9, does not make a convincing case for the single-door theory. To take one example, in *Clouds* 803–13 Strepsiades first tells Socrates to go into his house, and then apparently himself goes into his own; Dearden, who with good reason is not prepared to let Strepsiades go into the house into which he has just asked Socrates to go, has him going out and coming back by the *parodos* (*Stage*, pp. 28 f.), though this makes nonsense of 814 οὗτοι μὰ τὴν Ὀμίχλην ἔτ' ἐνταυθοῖ μενεῖς, where in view of 123 and 802 ἐνταυθοῖ can only mean 'here <in my house>'.

[21] K. J. Dover, *Aristophanic Comedy* (London, 1972), p.83.

[22] It depends on whether the emphasis in the sentence is on ἴδητε (implying 'I am now roasting the thrushes, but you cannot yet see me doing so; how much more will you envy me when you can!') or on τὰς κίχλας ὀπτωμένας (implying 'you now see me doing something other than roasting the thrushes' – e.g. skewering them, cf. 1007 – 'how much more will you envy me when I begin the actual cooking!'). The latter fits better with the context and the scenic probabilities, since it is most unlikely that Dikaiopolis cooks out of sight in this early part of the scene and comes outside later with all his equipment and helpers. Be that as it may, what is plainly and indubitably stated here is that the chorus will see the process (the participle is present) of roasting the thrushes. For the type of expression cf. *Knights* 1388, *Peace* 859, 863, 913, 916, 1351; the situation previewed in an utterance of this type always comes to pass (though in one or two cases in *Peace* it comes to pass only after the action of the play ends).

[23] It is certainly curious that the brazier had been brought out previously at 888. Possibly Dikaiopolis is supposed to have

other slaves who do not appear; then he does his own part of the job[24] in view of chorus and audience, and in the intervals of doing it he speaks with the various visitors. Finally at 1096 the house is 'closed up'; everything used in the cooking-scene, including the food, is withdrawn into the *skene* on the platform; and the relationship of 'inside' and 'outside' returns to normal.

This treatment of *Ach.* 1003–96 raises two other questions. A complication arises from the fact that the *ekkyklema* has already been used in the Euripides scene (410–79); the central door must thus change roles at least twice in the play, for in 202–346 it has no doubt represented the door of Dikaiopolis' house. To this, however, there are several parallels. In *Knights* the central door, which during most of the play has been that of the house of Demos, suddenly and without notice becomes the Propylaia at 1326; then at 1393, with talk of Paphlagon secreting the Peace-treaty-girls inside the house, we find that it has apparently reverted to its original status. In *Peace* it is likely that one and the same door represented the entrance to Zeus's palace in 177–728, and to Trygaios' house at the beginning and end of the play. In *Ecclesiazusae* the central door is probably that of Blepyros' house at the beginning of the play, and certainly at the end, but in between it plays a number of other roles. Even the double use of the *ekkyklema*, to represent scenes in two different houses, will have a parallel if Dearden[25] is right, as I believe he is, in maintaining that in *Clouds* the *ekkyklema* was used[26] both in 1–89 (Strepsiades' house) and in 181–509 (the Thinking-shop). In short, it was not felt by Aristophanes' contemporaries to be objectionable for the same door to perform successively more than one role in a play, even in interlaced order.[27] In *Acharnians* care is taken that during the period when the central door is that of Euripides, no mention is made of the door or house of Dikaiopolis, which drops out of the action from the time Dikaiopolis comes out of it at 366 until he goes back inside at 625.

The other repercussion of our proposal concerning *Ach.* 1003–96 is more interesting. In the extant plays of Aristophanes there are two other scenes where cooking is done on stage, *Peace* 1039–1126 and *Birds* 1579–1693; and one is naturally led to inquire whether the *ekkyklema* may have been used in these scenes also. In the *Peace* passage the answer is clearly no, since Trygaios and/or his slave are for ever fetching things from inside (938–55, 1033, 1040–2), which would be unnecessary if the *ekkyklema* were used, for then they would

intended originally to cook the eel on the spot, and then changed his mind; more likely the brazier and fan are brought out solely in order to figure as 'sacred objects' in the mock procession, including also Dikaiopolis' children and slaves, which escorts the eel to its new home. If the brazier had been left outside after 894, there would have been no need for Dikaiopolis to carry a heavy sack indoors at 970.

[24] This may have consisted only in the preparation and roasting of the thrushes; while Dikaiopolis' orders at 1014 and 1047 appear to be given to slaves actually with him, it is possible that some at least of the orders of 1040–3 are shouted by Dikaiopolis over his shoulder into the house (note ὀρθιασμάτων 1042, λάσκων 1046).

[25] *Stage*, pp. 64–7.

[26] Strictly, we should perhaps say 'was intended to be used', since it cannot be proved (though there is no positive reason to doubt) that the version of *Clouds* that was actually produced did contain these scenes in substantially the form in which we have them.

[27] It perhaps needs to be said that this in itself neither proves nor disproves that only one door was available in the *skene*: cf. pp.387–8 and n.20.

all have come out at once.[28] In the *Birds* passage things are less clear. In 1565–78 Peisetairos appears not to be on stage: Poseidon sees Cloudcuckooville (1565) but does not mention its ruler, and Herakles (1575 f.) refers to the ruler as 'the man, whoever he is, who has walled off the gods', which, especially by the absence of a demonstrative, strongly suggests that the ruler is not present. Then, at 1579, we suddenly find ourselves in the middle of cooking, having plunged even more abruptly *in medias res* than we do in *Acharnians*, and with no sign that anything has been brought by slaves from inside. I think it highly probable that Peisetairos, a bird-slave, and necessary properties are rolled out at 1579, and that the properties are rolled back at the end of the scene when Peisetairos goes off to heaven.

(5) Dikaiopolis has gone to his feast, and Lamachos to his warfare. Now a messenger warns the latter's household to prepare for his return wounded, and reports the tale of his misadventures.

ἀνὴρ τέτρωται χάρακι διαπηδῶν τάφρον,
καὶ τὸ σφυρὸν παλίωρρον ἐξεκόκκισεν,
καὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς κατέαγε περὶ λίθῳ πεσών, 1180
καὶ Γοργόν' ἐξήγειρεν ἐκ τῆς ἀσπίδος.
πτίλον δὲ †τὸ μέγα κομπολακύθου† πεσὸν
πρὸς ταῖς πέτραισι, δεινὸν ἐξηύδα μέλος·
'ὦ κλεινὸν ὄμμα, νῦν πανύστατόν σ' ἰδὼν
λείπω, φάος γε τοὐμόν· οὐκέτ' εἴμ' ἐγώ.' 1185
τοσαῦτα λέξας εἰς ὑδρορρόαν πεσὼν
ἀνίσταταί τε καὶ ξυναντᾷ δραπέταις,
λῃστὰς ἐλαύνων καὶ κατασπέρχων δορί.
ὁδὶ δὲ καὐτός. ἀλλ' ἄνοιγε τὴν θύραν. 1189

1182 πεσὸν R^{pc} recc.: πεσὼν R^{ac}AEΓ: utrumque cognovit $\Sigma^{E\Gamma}$
1185 γε om. R.
1188 λῃστὰς cett.: λῃσταῖς R.

At first glance much in 1181–8 seems nonsensical, and Blaydes has had several followers in his proposal to delete the lines.[29] There is, however, no obvious occasion or motive for their interpolation, and the messenger-speeches found in the corresponding place just before the exodos in *Birds* (1706–19) and *Ecclesiazusae* (1112–26) likewise have a measure of incoherence – stemming in *Birds*, as here, from an excess of paratragedy, and in *Ecclesiazusae* from an excess of alcohol – so that one might well set up as one of the minor formal features of Old Comedy this breathless, half-incoherent, joyful or occasionally sorrowful, messenger-speech heralding the final appearance of a comic hero in triumph or of a paratragic 'hero' in his misfortune.[30] In addition there is positive

[28] It is tempting to take 942, 'That is certainly plain <, that the gods are favouring us>; for look, here's the altar outside!', as referring to the quasi-miraculous appearance of an altar (and other properties: cf. 948–9) on the *ekkyklema*; but an altar so placed might be a little difficult to walk round (956–8), and Trygaios would not have needed to fetch a table (1033) since it would have been waiting inconspicuously on the platform to be used when needed. *Peace* 942 must be otherwise explained: see Dearden, *Stage*, pp. 46–8, 161.

[29] Of whom I was one, in my translation of the play (Harmondsworth, 1973).

[30] *Wasps* 1474–81 might be regarded as another example of the type.

evidence of the genuineness of the passage in the shape of the scholion[31] which asserts that 1188 is taken from Euripides' *Telephos* (fr. 705a Nauck–Snell = 112 Austin[32]). The genuineness of 1188 almost inevitably[33] entails that of the rest of the passage, with the possible exception of 1181. But the assurance that the lines are Aristophanic leaves them no less troublesome to understand.[34]

1181 Fraenkel (p.33), following Dobree, rejected this line as having been interpolated, with slight alteration, from 574. He does not, however, suggest what can have been the motive for such an interpolation, nor what the interpolator thought the line meant, and his only objection to 1181 is that it 'can have nothing at all to do with Lamachos' misfortune, however grotesquely that may be described'. This was adequately refuted by Rau (p. 140): the line emphasizes the violence of Lamachos' fall mentioned in 1180 – the shock was such that it even woke the painted Gorgon from her sleep on his shield![35] The mere fact that the line is a near repetition of 574 is not by itself evidence of interpolation: it might be so in a tragedy,[36] but there we are usually dealing with the work of fourth-century actors, and so far as we know they did not perform, let alone tamper with, Aristophanic comedies. It is true[37] that the parallels usually cited for *Ach.* 574 = 1181, such as *Clouds* 225 = 1503,[38] are not quite in point, since they all involve a dialogue in which A crushes B by quoting B's own words back at him; but Aristophanes can repeat himself without such justification (e.g. *Wasps*

[31] This scholion is preserved only in late manuscripts (Vp3, C, L); but there is no reason to doubt that it is ancient, and was overlooked by the copyists of the scholia in the older extant manuscripts or their exemplars as they approached the end of their task.

[32] C. Austin, *Nova fragmenta Euripidea in papyris reperta* (Berlin, 1968).

[33] Although Wilamowitz (*Hermes* 54 (1919), 58 = *Kl.Schr.* iv. 296), who first drew general attention to the evidence that *Ach.* 1188 was a quotation from *Telephos*, believed that 1188 could be accepted as genuine without also accepting 1181–7; 'an 1180,' he asserted, 'schliesst der Vers tadellos ein.' Few, I think, would agree with this claim: Lamachos evidently fell and cracked his head on a stone (1180) after, and as a result of, the injuries mentioned in 1178–9 – at a moment, therefore, when he was no longer 'chasing and repelling the raiders with his spear'. If there is a line to which 1188 'fits flawlessly on', it is, as Rennie saw, 1178: Lamachos was wounded by a stake when leaping over a ditch in pursuit of the raiders. But to bring 1188 next to 1178 would require either the deletion of the blameless verses 1179 f., or the disruption by transposition of the additive sequence of injuries in 1178–80 with considerable loss of rhetorical effect.

[34] Since Wilamowitz's discussion (cf. preceding note), the chief treatments of the passage have been: W. Buchwald, *Studien zur Chronologie der attischen Tragödie 455 bis 431* (Diss. Königsberg, 1939), p.27; V. Coulon(-Tauber), *Philologus* 95 (1942), 31–40; H. Erbse, *Eranos* 52 (1954), 89–96; D. L. Page, *WSt* 69 (1956), 125–7; A. M. Dale, *BICS* 8 (1961), 47–8 = *Collected Papers*, pp. 170–2; E. Fraenkel, *Beobachtungen zu Aristophanes* (Rome, 1962), pp. 31–42; K. J. Dover, *Maia* 15 (1963), 23–5; J. Taillardat, *Les Images d'Aristophane*[2] (Paris, 1965), p.367; P. Rau, *Paratragodia* (Munich, 1967), pp. 139–42; M. L. West, *CR* 21 (1971), 157–8. These are referred to hereafter by author's name only.

[35] For ἐξεγείρειν ἐκ 'rouse from <one's sleep on>', cf. *Od.* 4. 730 ἐκ λεχέων μ' ἀνεγείραι; similarly, with the preposition omitted in lyrics, Eur. *Herakles* 1050 εὐνᾶς ἐγείρετε, *Rhesos* 532 κοιτᾶν ἔγρεσθε (text suspect on metrical grounds: ἔξιτε Hartung, which the *Christus Patiens* seems to support). There is no need to suppose, as many have done, that the line must mean that the Gorgon somehow (how?) fell or was knocked off the shield.

[36] Certain and possible tragic examples are collected by Barrett in his note on Eur. *Hipp.* 1049.

[37] West points this out against Dover who first brought these parallels into the discussion.

[38] For a full list see Rau, p.101 n.13 and p.139 n.6.

429 = 1292), and here, if the audience recall the previous use of a similar sentence, they may well be amused by the repetition of Lamachos' bombastic phraseology in such an undignified context.

1182 If the text of this line is not corrupt, we must read *πεσὸν* and suppose either (Coulon, p.37) that *πτίλον . . . πεσὸν* is an accusative absolute or (Wilamowitz, p.58; Fraenkel, p.38; Dale) that the speech in 1184–5 is made by the feather. Of the latter fantasy West has, I trust, finally disposed. The accusative-absolute hypothesis is tenable in itself, but not very appealing, since if the accusative absolute with non-impersonal participles exists at all it is purely comic,[39] so that the last place we would expect to find it is in this paratragic rhesis; besides, there are other suspicious things in the line.

It is natural to seek to emend *πεσὸν/πεσὼν*, which could so easily have slipped in here from 1180; but the popularity of Weber's conjecture *κλάσας*[40] is surprising, considering that the simplex *κλᾶν* is never found in Aristophanes or in tragedy – quite apart from the doubt that must exist as to whether a person who falls in such a way that his plume is pressed between his helmet and the ground, and its central shaft snaps, can be said *τὸ πτίλον κλάσαι*.[41] Nor has any other even remotely plausible substitute for *πεσὼν/πεσὸν* been proposed. And except for the problem about the relation of the participial phrase to the rest of the sentence, the reading *πεσὸν* is not in itself objectionable: the repetition of *πεσὼν* (1180) is trivial in comparison with such a sequence as *ἥκουσιν* (23) – *ἥκοντες* (24) – *ἐλθόντες* (25); for the construction *πεσὸν πρὸς ταῖς πέτραισι* cf. Eur. *Ba.* 605.[42]

We are therefore justified in asking whether the corruption in 1182 perhaps lies not in *πεσὸν* but earlier in the line; and indeed objection has been made by Dover to *πτίλον τὸ μέγα* and to *κομπολακύθου*.[43] I can see nothing wrong with the former phrase. The plumes in Lamachos' helmet have throughout been called indifferently *πτερά* (584, 1103, 1105) and *πτίλα* (585 ff., 1082[44]), both by Lamachos himself and by Dikaiopolis; there were several of them (1082, 1103) but one was particularly noteworthy, presumably for its size (note the definite article in 584 *φέρε νυν ἀπὸ τοῦ κράνους μοι <u>τὸ</u> πτερόν*), and this no doubt is the one now referred to as *πτίλον τὸ μέγα*.

[39] On the non-comic examples cited e.g. by Coulon, see Fraenkel, pp. 36–8; but *Plut.* 277–8 and Ar. fr. 647 are hard to explain away. In the *Plutus* passage (*ἐν τῇ σορῷ νυνὶ λαχὸν τὸ γράμμα σου δικάζειν, σὺ δ' οὐ βαδίζεις;*) there is no reason to claim, as Fraenkel does, that *λαχὸν* is impersonal; rather its subject is *τὸ γράμμα σου* (your lettered division of the corps of jurors'). Cf. *Clouds* 623–4 *λαχὼν 'Υπέρβολος τῆτες ἱερομνημονεῖν*. Against the evidence of fr. 647 (*ἀλλὰ τὸ στρόφιον λυθὲν τὰ κάρυά μου 'ξέπιπτεν*) all that Fraenkel can find to say is that it is 'completely useless as an example because we do not know what form the entire sentence took'; what conceivable form can it have taken that would invalidate the example? The natural conclusion on the evidence is that in colloquial speech of Aristophanes' time the use of the accusative as the 'absolute case' neuter participles was occasionally extended from impersonal to personal verbs; it may be significant for the stylistic level of this usage that the speaker in *Plutus* is a slave and in the fragment apparently a woman.

[40] Adopted by Coulon in his edition, but withdrawn in his critical note on *Plut.* 277 and in *REG* 44 (1931), 20–1; favoured by Rau and West.

[41] The nearest parallel is probably the use of *κατᾶξαι* to mean 'break by accidentally dropping' (*Ach.* 931, *Wasps* 1436).

[42] It is thus not necessary, with Erbse 90, to take *πρὸς ταῖς πέτραισι* with *ἐξηύδα* ('lying on the rocks he spoke').

[43] Dover also took exception to *πεσὸν* on the ground of the syntactic difficulty and of the repetition of the word.

[44] Here we should read, with van Leeuwen, *Γηρυόνη τετράπτιλε*.

It is otherwise with the word κομπολακύθου. The original appearance of this fantasy-bird in 589 was an example of a common Aristophanic topos: someone sees an unusual-looking person or object, wonders what on earth it can be, and makes one or more ridiculous suggestions. Examples of this pattern appear at *Clouds* 1260–1, *Wasps* 1509, *Birds* 1203, *Lys.* 982, *Eccl.* 1071–3, *Plut.* 422–7/435–6; and in every case the suggested identifications are forgotten once they have served their purpose of raising a laugh. Not for a moment did even Dikaiopolis suppose that the κομπολάκυθος bird really existed, or was really the source of Lamachos' plume; his sole object was to make fun of Lamachos, as at 591–2, 619, 1080, 1082, 1084, and throughout 1098–1142; Lamachos does not treat the suggestion as a request for information but as an impertinent insult (590 οἴμ', ὡς τεθνήξεις). It would go against the spirit of the three Dikaiopolis–Lamachos scenes, and against all the parallels cited above, if we were now at 1182 quite casually to discover that Dikaiopolis' absurd suggestion was accurate.[45]

It is not difficult to see how κομπολακύθου can have found its way into the text of 1182. It will originally have been a gloss on πτίλον τὸ μέγα, meaning in effect 'this refers to the plume that was the subject of the joke in 589'. As to what it has replaced in the text, the sense is our only guide. Something on the lines of Dover's 'and seeing his feather crushed . . .' is plausible: e.g. πτίλον δὲ τὸ μέγ' <ὡς εἶδεν ἐκ κράνους> πεσὸν 'and when he saw that the great down-feather had fallen from his helmet on the rocks . . .'.

1184–5 I have nothing to add to the arguments of Coulon (p.38) and Rau (pp. 140–1) in favour of taking this little speech as being addressed by Lamachos to the feather, as if to a beloved one from whom he is being parted. Exception has sometimes been taken to the expression φάος γε τοὐμόν, but it is perfectly sound: for 'my light' = 'that for which I yearn' cf. Soph. *Aj.* 394 σκότος ἐμὸν φάος; for γε the numerous examples collected by Denniston, *Greek Particles*2 (Oxford, 1954), pp. 138–9; for the word-order exemplified by φάος τοὐμόν there are numerous parallels in tragedy[46] and some in passages of more elevated style in Aristophanes.[47]

1186–7 have often been thought to be nonsense: how could Lamachos fall into a ditch after making his little speech? is he not on the ground already (1180)? Fraenkel (p.41) cheerfully accepts the nonsense: 'Aristophanes is here parodying the messenger-speeches of Euripides with the same frivolity in juxtaposing incongruent elements that he uses twenty years later in his travesty of the tragedian's monodies (*Frogs* 1331–63).' But as Rau (p. 142) notes, the two cases are not parallel: 'the parodies of arias parody incongruencies of the model itself, while in Euripides' messenger-speeches such incongruencies do not occur.' The

[45] Cf. Page, p.126. Note also that in 1105 Lamachos, singling out one of his plumes for special mention, called it the feather of an ostrich (στρούθου), and it is at least plausible that this is the same outsize plume that was ridiculed earlier. Fraenkel, p.38 defends κομπολακύθου, arguing that both in 589 and in 1182 the κομπολάκυθος-bird is to be equated with Lamachos himself (he might have compared *Birds* 287–90, where the κατωφαγᾶς-bird is equated with Kleonymos); but in that case it is surprising that the identification, which is essential to the joke (and would be essential to the very intelligibility of 1182), is never made explicit (contrast *Birds* 284 Καλλίας ἄρ' οὗτος οὔρνις ἐστίν, 290 Κλεώνυμός γ' ὤν).

[46] For noun + τοὐμόν – even disregarding all other inflected forms of the latter – cf. Aesch. *Eum.* 409, 454, 1024–5; *Prom.* 1051–2; Soph. *Aj.* 658; *Tr.* 142, 1197; *El.* 452; Eur. *Hipp.* 1208; *Andr.* 166; *Hek.* 501; *El.* 688, 868; *Ion* 1021; *Hel.* 502.

[47] Cf. *Birds* 636; *Eccl.* 958–9, 967–8 (all lyric).

nonsensical and pointless inconsistency we are asked to accept here would be of quite a different order from the measure of breathless incoherence which we have seen to be typical of the Aristophanic mock messenger-speech.

Rau therefore rightly attempts to find an intelligible sense in 1186–7. He argues that Lamachos, lying wounded, could perfectly well have fallen into a channel without first rising to his feet 'provided we imagine the water to be close enough'; but it may be doubted whether πεσών would be the appropriate word for a man already on the ground sliding or rolling down into a watercourse.

A more probable solution is that first suggested, so far as I know, by A. Couat.[48] He translated εἰς ὑδρορρόαν πεσών 'à la suite d'une chute ridicule dans un fossé': in other words, he took εἰς ὑδρορρόαν πεσών to be subordinate to τοσαῦτα λέξας.[49] Lamachos did not fall into a ditch after making his speech: rather, he is now said to have made the speech after falling into a ditch (no doubt the ditch mentioned in 1178).[50] Having made the speech, he gets to his feet (ἀνίσταται) and encounters some runaways; we are not told who these runaways are, but since the speech as a whole is a (mock) report of an unmitigated disaster, it is most natural to suppose that they are Lamachos' own routed troops.[51]

1188, on the other hand, is nonsense unalloyed in the present context: Lamachos is in no state to chase anyone.[52] It is, however, a type of nonsense found elsewhere in Aristophanic parody: a phrase or sentence is extended by a tag quoted from tragedy or lyric which fits the context in its style or its source or both, but not in its sense. An example in this play is the phrase ἐκπλεύσας σκάφει in 541, which is in all probability, like 1188, a quotation from Euripides' *Telephos*.[53] In Euripides, no doubt, the phrase referred to hypothetical Mysian raids on Greek territory or shipping. In *Acharnians* it is thrust into a sentence about Spartans confiscating smuggled goods; and despite all interpretative

[48] Cited by Erbse, p.93 n.2. I pass over the far-fetched *Kombination* by which Erbse himself attempts to prove that ὑδρορρόα here means 'urinary incontinence', except to note that even if the word could bear that meaning, the standard sign of terror in Aristophanes is not urinary but *faecal* incontinence.

[49] It is not common for the second of two successive participial phrases thus to be subordinate to, and refer to an earlier time than, the first; but cf. Pl. *Rep.* 366 a λισσόμενοι ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες, πείθοντες αὐτοὺς ἀζήμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν '*making entreaty for our sins and transgressions* we shall persuade the gods and get off without punishment' (trans. Lindsay; emphasis mine).

[50] The absence of an article with ὑδρορρόαν is not surprising in paratragic language; it adds to the general absurdity that ὑδρορρόα, unlike τάφρος (with 1178 cf. Soph. *Aj.* 1279 πηδῶντος ἄρδην Ἕκτορος τάφρων ὕπερ), is a down-to-earth word not found in tragedy.

[51] For δραπέτης referring to the behaviour of a coward, rather than that of an absconding slave, cf. Soph. *Aj.* 1285.

[52] Rau, p.142, tries to make sense of the line by claiming that it refers 'ironically to the heroic deed of Lamachos as a whole . . . as it was looked forward to by the hero, not as it happened'; but if the line is meant to modify in sense 1178–87 as a whole, it is very awkward to make it depend grammatically on 1187 only, as Aristophanes has done. The conjecture δραπέτας, whose corollary would be the construing of ξυναντᾷ with δορί (so Coulon), has been correctly evaluated by Fraenkel, p.41 n.1.

[53] There is no actual authority in the scholia or elsewhere for this supposition; but the very incongruity of the phrase with its context, the high-poetic use of σκάφος = 'boat', and the fact that this part of Dikaiopolis' speech is studded with quotations from *Telephos* (540, 543, 555–6 = fr. 708, 709, 710), combine to make it highly probable: cf. Wilamowitz, pp. 58–9. The phrase (along with φέρ' εἰ from the beginning of 541) appears as Eur. fr. 708a Nauck–Snell = 116 Austin.

efforts,[54] there is no way a Spartan could have 'sailed out in a boat' to do that. The point of the phrase must be that it is a tragic quotation which is suited to the general context (because it comes from the apologia of the disguised Telephos, of which Dikaiopolis' speech is a parody), but whose sense is ludicrously unsuited to the immediate context. Cf. also *Wasps* 308 (*πόρον Ἕλλας ἱερόν*), *Birds* 1247 (*καὶ δόμους Ἀμφίονος*). Likewise *Acharnians* 1188 is a tragic quotation whose style and source (for presumably it comes from a narrative of the wounding of a hero[55]) suits the general context, but which makes no sense in the immediate context; and it is evident from the poet's repeated use of this trick that he thought it comically effective.

In conclusion, the entire passage may be thus translated:

> The man's been wounded by a stake in jumping over a trench, and wrenched his ankle backwards and put it out of joint, and broken his head falling on a stone, and woken up the Gorgon from her sleep on his shield. And <when he saw> the great feather had fallen <out of his helmet> on to the rocks, he intoned a terrible cry: 'My glorious treasure, now I look on you for the last time and leave you, the light of my life. I am no more.' These were his words when he fell in a ditch; then he rose and came face to face with his fleeing men as he 'chased and repelled the raiders with his spear'. Here he is. Open the door!

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[54] Such as the Custom House launch dreamed up by J. S. Reid (*ap.* Merry). Others have sought to get coherent sense by emending *φήνας* in 542 (e.g. *κλέψας* Müller, *δήσας* Hamaker, *χῆν' ἤ* van Leeuwen), thus destroying or obscuring the parallel (necessary to Dikaiopolis' argument) between the activities of the hypothetical Spartan and the alleged activities of Athenian *συκοφάνται* against Megarian goods (515–22).

[55] See E. W. Handley in Handley and Rea, *The 'Telephus' of Euripides* (*BICS.* Suppl. 5, 1957), pp. 28–9, who reasonably assigns it to Telephos' own account, in the prologue of the play, of how he came by his famous wound.

Postscript: To the bibliography in n.34 there should be added Dover's discussion in *Illinois Classical Studies* ii (1977), 156–8, which appeared too late for me to do more than call attention to it.